Inam Ul Haque---------------
The April 22, 2025 attack on unsuspecting tourist on the Baisaram
meadow in Pehelgam (Shepherds' Valley), Anantnag District in the
illegally occupied Indian side of Kashmir is condemnable. Civilian
fratricide in Kashmir's war of liberation remains a sad collateral
damage.
The fact that Anantnag has been experiencing attacks on Hindu
pilgrims repeatedly in the past and is a high security zone for Indian
security forces, raises questions.
Without getting into conspiracy theories that are making rounds
on either side of the Indo-Pakistan border, and despite the narratives
pushed forward by the light weight, immature and jingoist Indian
media; on the face of it, it seems a monumental security failure of the
Indian establishment.
So, when a handful of militants, in military fatigues, singled out and
shot tourists in broad daylight with no immediate reaction by LEAs
on site, including the Indian Army, the politicians saw an opportunity
to turn this into another opening to whiplash the arch enemy Pakistan.
From the Indian perspective, putting the blame immediately on
Pakistan and calling 'The Resistance Front (TRF)' — the obscure group
that took responsibility for the attack — an extension of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) without any evidence, made sense. It puts Pakistan — which already suffers from image problem thanks to the incessant Indian propaganda internationally and the likes of Khawaja Asif domestically — on the defensive; it enhances Islamabad's financial woes; and it provides a casus belli or justification for any subsequent Indian reaction, diplomatically and militarily.
So, as a knee-jerk reaction, New Delhi held in abeyance the 1960
Indus Water Treaty (IWT) that it had been eyeing to undo for quite
some time, in addition to other steps including downgrading diplomatic relations, etc. In a tit-for-tat response, Pakistan also suspended the 1972 Shimla (Simla) Agreement reached after the 1971 War, revoking the status of Line of Control (LoC),
besides overflight rights to Indianowned and Indian-registered aircraft.
Following discourse deals with some aspects of the standoff.
First, India in such eventualities, buoyed by its economic and military
muscles, has been following a pattern to building a case for
retaliatory strikes against Pakistan.
It reacted militarily for Pulwama attacks in Pakistan proper at Balakot
in 2019, a first 'first', and undertook major escalatory actions for Bombay attacks in 2008, Parliament attack in 2001, etc.
The 2008 stand-off was only de-escalated when the US and the
UK issued travel advisories against visiting India; the Bangalore IT
enterprise strongly objected to the domestic political rhetoric for losing business; and the stock market plummeted. Escalation harms India more than Pakistan.
Second, at the moment, there seems no international appetite for
any conflict in the subcontinent. Despite Modi's calls to numerous
world leaders, briefing of over 100 diplomatic missions by the External
Affairs Ministry 'ostensibly' to build case for striking Pakistan, all major
powers including the US, the EU, Russia, China, Turkey, etc have
called for calm. Iran has offered to mediate.
Unlike the 2019 'signaling support' to Modi, Trump 2.0 is more
distracted by domestic agenda and has yet to appoint a US ambassador to New Delhi despite 100 days in office.
Lack of sharing compelling evidence by New Delhi in its
'exterior maneuver' is seen as India either waiting for more details,
or Modi Sarkar feeling little need to justify its subsequent action
to anyone. India might interpret international sympathy for losses in
the cited attack as green light for its reaction.
This, when combined with domestic pressure to respond, makes
any incursion or strike by New Delhi likely. The Tuesday highlevel meeting by Modi Government authorised the Indian military to respond; however, the form, format and timing is unclear. Indian military 'may' keep it limited to Kashmir.
Third, Indian reaction, in whatever form would 'unmistakenly' elicit a strong response from Pakistan for precisely the same compelling political reasons. If Pulwama recently and the nuclear blasts (Pokhran II vs Chaghai I and II) in 1998 are any guide, Pakistan would outdo the Indian reaction militarily and psychologically. And the ensuing cycle might get out of control transcending into the nuclear domain, for which Pakistan has conveyed its position unambiguously.
Fourth, for a long time the Indian miltablishment believes in
the availability of space for a limited conventional war between both sides under the nuclear overhang about which I have written in the past. See "The dangers of calling Pakistan's 'nuclear bluff'" published on September 3, 2019. Indian military leaders — serving and retired —
might be baying for a fight, for remaining relevant in case of retired
lot; and under 'legacy, tamgha (medal) and promotion syndrome' in
case of serving officer.
However, senior military leadership might miscalculate Pakistan's resolve, the tenacity of its armed forces, now battle-hardened, and the clarity of its leadership, both military and political. Pakistan's noisy 'inner front' would jell like hell, once the shots with a bang are fired.
Fifth, India climbs the 'escalation ladder' higher and quicker. Any
unacceptable territorial losses, force destruction, infrastructure damage and casualties in case of the much smaller Pakistan in a protracted conflict would amount to crossing the psychological thresholds, the red lines that remains ill-defined and amorphous, and can force the nuclear hand. And in that eventuality, the conflict would not remain limited to the region. It would spill out of the state of 'managed hostility', as Mr Shankar Menon, India's former NSA, fondly names the Indo-Pak crisis.
Sixth, Mr Modi, for some time has been following pages from
Netanyahu's playbook in Palestine.
Revocation of Article 370 in Kashmir, following racial profiling and discrimination against Indian Muslims under Hindutva-laced vigilante justice and brow-beating India's neighbours under hegemony on steroids are continuing cases in point.
However, the 'Butcher of Gujarat' needs to know that Pakistan is not Gaza, it is not Kashmir, he is not Bibi, India is not Israel, and Trump his presumed backer still jokes about his Indian accent. And Pakistan as a state is not isolated, given its Muslim Arab interface and the Chinese clout. War is in nobody's favour, but if push comes to shove, Pakistan, its people, its government and its armed forces would surprise the super confident 'Shining' India! 

@TET