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२६ बुधबार, मंसिर २०८१23rd July 2024, 10:09:55 am

Pakistan’s Security Challenges Threaten to Undermine Its Relationship with China

१२ बुधबार , मंसिर २०८११४ दिन अगाडि

Pakistan’s Security Challenges Threaten to Undermine Its Relationship with China

Written by Osama Ahmad -  -  -

China and Pakistan have long enjoyed close relations, often described as an “ironclad friendship.” However, the historically close relationship between Pakistan and China is currently facing significant pressure due to increasing security threats. In recent years, attacks on Chinese nationals and infrastructure within Pakistan, particularly those associated with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), have multiplied. This has put Pakistan in a delicate position as China has grown increasingly vocal about its expectations for more robust security measures. Despite Pakistan’s efforts to boost security, a persistent wave of violence raises questions about Islamabad’s ability to protect Chinese interests, which could badly damage relations between the two countries. If Pakistan fails to protect Chinese nationals, relations could deteriorate to the point that Islamabad risks losing its only major ally.

The Growing Threat to CPEC

The cornerstone of the relationship between China and Pakistan is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship initiative of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), valued at around USD $60 billion with roughly $25 billion invested to date. Since its beginning in 2013, CPEC has been instrumental in funding various infrastructure projects, including highways, power plants, and the development of the strategic Gwadar Port, which promises significant economic dividends for Pakistan.

Despite the promises of economic growth, CPEC has also exposed Pakistan to new security challenges. Chinese nationals have been the frequent target of attacks by various terrorist and insurgent groups. High-profile incidents, such as the March 26 attack on Chinese engineers in Shangla, a 2021 Dasu bus attack that killed nine Chinese engineers, and a 2022 attack on Karachi University’s Confucius Institute, have underscored the vulnerability of Chinese citizens working in Pakistan. These incidents have not only disrupted projects but have also compelled China to reconsider its level of involvement and safety in Pakistan.

Chinese nationals and their interests in Pakistan are targeted primarily by Baloch separatist groups, with the Pakistani Taliban a secondary threat. Groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) oppose CPEC projects, arguing that the Chinese exploit local resources without benefiting the region’s indigenous population. The BLA twice warned China to leave Balochistan or face increased attacks. Meanwhile, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has also targeted Chinese interests. However, its motivation is likely derived from its ideological opposition to the Pakistani state. TTP considers Pakistan to be an “infidel state” and aims to wage a war against it and its allies. Pakistan has struggled to eliminate the diverse threats from these terrorist groups with differing agendas, thereby exasperating its closest ally.

China’s Increasing Frustration with Pakistan

China’s frustration with Pakistan has grown more visible and harsh in recent years, marked by a shift from behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure to public demands for enhanced security measures. Following repeated attacks on Chinese nationals, China has increased its calls for more rigorous protection, even hinting at employing private security firms if Pakistan cannot guarantee safety. Pakistan has pledged to improve the protection of Chinese nationals, but its capacity to meet these expectations has been disappointing so far. Earlier this year, after an attack on Chinese nationals in Shangla, China halted two projects temporarily and raised concerns over Pakistan’s counterterrorism measures. This pause signified a rare show of China’s dissatisfaction and indicated how security concerns could impact broader economic cooperation. The crisis reached a boiling point recently when the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan made furious comments publicly in a seminar about Pakistan’s inability to stop the terrorists from attacking Chinese nationals. These comments came in the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Karachi targeting the Chinese engineers in Karachi, just days before the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Islamabad. Pakistan’s foreign office pushed back in response. 

Pakistan has announced two new military and counterterrorism efforts in response to the violence. The first is Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, a new military campaign the government unveiled in June 2024 to tackle terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. The campaign was announced just days after Prime Minister Sharif and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Munir visited China. Since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, Afghanistan has seen a resurgence of various militant groups, including the TTP, which finds safe haven across the border. Pakistan has repeatedly called on the Taliban government in Afghanistan to prevent militants from using Afghan soil to launch attacks. But asking the Afghan Taliban to halt terrorism in Pakistan may not work, as the TTP and Afghan Taliban are two sides of the same coin. The second campaign is a just-announced “comprehensive military operation” focused on Balochistan with the goal of “reinvigorating Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign.” While details of the operation have yet to emerge, any military effort to counter the threat of militancy from the BLA and other groups will face a complex operating environment with diverse drivers of instability.

In seeking to carry out these and other ongoing security operations, Pakistan’s security forces are stretched thin and have limited operational capacity to address diverse threats from multiple actors. While Beijing seeks to supplement Pakistan’s forces with Chinese support through joint security efforts and counterterrorism drills, this approach risks introducing additional Chinese personnel, who could themselves become targets for militants.

The Risks of China-Pakistan Drift

China’s investment through CPEC has aided Pakistan’s economy, creating over 155,000 jobs and bringing much-needed infrastructure to underserved areas. However, the security risks associated with these projects and China’s frustration with Pakistan over its inability to protect Chinese nationals may lead it to reconsider its investments or place stricter conditions on future agreements. For Pakistan, which is grappling with economic instability and a severe debt crisis, any reduction in Chinese investment would be a significant setback, exacerbating existing challenges and limiting growth opportunities. Moreover, any delay or cancellation of CPEC projects risks further damaging Pakistan’s reputation as a safe destination for foreign investment, thereby deterring other international investors. Pakistan recently worked hard but ultimately failed to secure investments from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to alleviate its financial crisis.

Challenges in Pak-China relations could prompt Beijing to recalibrate its South Asia strategy. While China is unlikely to abandon its partnership with Pakistan completely, the ongoing security issues could push Beijing to diversify its regional relationships, potentially strengthening ties with other countries that offer a more stable environment for Chinese investments. Despite its complex relationship with China, India presents an attractive investment alternative given its economic potential and relative security.  A solid trade connection already exists between the two countries. For instance, Chinese imports to India surpassed USD $100 billion in fiscal year 2024, making China Delhi’s largest trading partner. Moreover, India and China recently attempted to significantly ease border tensions, which could bring the two countries closer and boost Chinese investments in India. China is also aggressively investing in Afghanistan and recently launched a direct railway line connecting western China and northern Afghanistan. 

Such realignments would have serious implications for Pakistan. Not only would they limit Pakistan’s options for economic support, but they could also reduce China’s geopolitical backing on key issues. Maintaining China’s support remains especially critical in areas such as defense. China is Pakistan’s largest defense equipment supplier and key supporter of vital national security initiatives, including its ballistic missile program. Pakistan has also received support from China on issues like Afghanistan and Kashmir on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Pakistan’s removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Support of this kind makes it imperative for Islamabad to address threats to CPEC personnel and infrastructure effectively.

Conclusion

Pakistan’s security challenges represent a serious threat to its relationship with China, a partnership that has been the mainstay of Pakistan’s foreign and economic policy. Repeated targeting of Chinese nationals by different terrorist groups underscores the weaknesses in Pakistan’s current counterterrorism measures. If Islamabad cannot assure Beijing of its commitment and ability to protect Chinese interests, it risks a diplomatic rift that could curtail the flow of Chinese investment and lead to a strategic realignment against Pakistan’s national security interests. In case of Beijing’s falling out with Pakistan, Islamabad will be isolated regionally as well as internationally, as it does not have good working relations with the United States at present. Ultimately, Pakistan’s failure to act represents a risk to its strategic relevance.

Also Read: SCO 2024: Pakistan’s Strategic Moment to Influence Regional Perceptions

@SAV