In recent months, Indian media outlets and policymakers have intensified a familiar narrative - the so-called “China water threat” - claiming that China’s Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra) hydropower project poses ecological and geopolitical risks to South Asia. This alarmism, echoed in The Times of India’s article “Mega Dam on China’s Yarlung Tsangpo River: A Tectonic Gamble for South Asia,” reflects not hydrological science but India’s enduring insecurity complex.

A closer look reveals an inconvenient truth: the real challenge to South Asia’s water stability lies not in China’s upstream projects but in India’s decades-long monopolization and politicization of Transboundary Rivers. It is India not China that has turned water into an instrument of power, wielding control over its neighbors Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan in defiance of international fairness and regional trust.

India’s Record of Water Hegemony: Turning Rivers into Leverage

South Asia is home to some of the world’s most densely populated river basins, yet the governance of these shared waters has been marred by India’s unilateralism. Since independence, India has used its geographic advantage to dominate regional water systems, often disregarding treaty obligations and humanitarian considerations.

Against Pakistan: Weaponizing the Indus

The Indus River is Pakistan’s lifeline  supporting 90% of its agriculture and 70% of its population. The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), brokered by the World Bank, granted Pakistan rights over the western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab while India retained control over the eastern tributaries.

Yet, in practice, India has repeatedly used the treaty as a strategic weapon. In April 2025, New Delhi unilaterally restricted the Baglihar Dam’s outflows under the pretext of “counterterrorism,” slashing Pakistan’s irrigation supply and triggering a severe food shortage. Prime Minister Modi’s threat that “not a drop of Indian water will flow to Pakistan” encapsulated this coercive posture. Dams such as Baglihar and Pakal Dul - both located in disputed Jammu and Kashmir - now give India operational control over critical flow regimes, undermining the very purpose of the treaty and pushing Pakistan toward agricultural and humanitarian crises.

Against Bangladesh: The Farakka Factor

Bangladesh, one of the most water-dependent nations on Earth, has long suffered under India’s control of the Ganges. The Farakka Barrage, constructed in 1975, enables India to divert large volumes of water before the river crosses into Bangladesh. Despite the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, India’s dry-season releases often fall below agreed levels, while uncoordinated upstream discharges during monsoons exacerbate floods downstream.

A UN FAO report estimated that the Farakka Barrage alone causes Bangladesh to lose 1.8 million tons of grain annually. India’s persistent refusal to share real-time hydrological data further cripples Bangladesh’s disaster-preparedness, turning a natural dependency into a strategic vulnerability.

Against Afghanistan: Damming Leverage

In Afghanistan, India’s upstream infrastructure on the Kabul and Kishenganga rivers has complicated an already fragile water situation. These projects, built under the guise of development cooperation, divert tributaries that feed Afghan agriculture. With droughts intensifying, such diversions deepen food insecurity and limit Afghanistan’s autonomy over its own water resources.

India’s approach - project monopolies combined with technological restrictions - ensures that Afghanistan remains dependent, cementing New Delhi’s leverage over Kabul’s internal stability.

The Colonial DNA of India’s Water Policy

India’s water hegemony did not emerge in isolation; it is the modern expression of colonial hydraulic politics. The British Raj used canal networks to control populations and allocate privilege. The Bari Doab Canal (1868) bypassed Pashtun areas to favor Sikh and Hindu landlords, embedding inequality into the subcontinent’s water system.

Independent India inherited and weaponized this system. Water control became central to national strategy - from the “linking rivers” mega-schemes to the Modi government’s 2019 declaration that “water is India’s national security frontier.” The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has fused this policy with populist nationalism, using slogans like “no water for terrorism” to deflect domestic discontent.

The result: a regional water regime dominated not by cooperation but coercion - sustained by political manipulation and enabled by Western silence.

Scientific Reality: The Yarlung Zangbo Project Is Not a Threat

Contrary to India’s claims, China’s Yarlung Zangbo (Brahmaputra) hydropower project is grounded in scientific management and international environmental standards.

The river’s hydrology makes India’s alarmism unsustainable: only 15–20% of the Brahmaputra’s total flow originates in Tibet; the remaining 80–85% is generated within India and Bangladesh through monsoonal rainfall and tributaries. Hydropower dams, moreover, do not consume water - they temporarily store it to generate electricity before releasing it downstream through the same channel.

Thus, the project has negligible downstream impact. Instead, it represents a milestone in renewable energy: a clean-power initiative that will triple the capacity of China’s Three Gorges Dam, cutting carbon emissions and promoting transboundary climate resilience. Far from a geopolitical gamble, it is a technological and ecological opportunity for the entire region.

Toward a Cooperative South Asian Water Framework

The real need of the hour is a new hydrological framework for South Asia - one built on transparency, science, and fairness. China’s practice of sharing flood data with India since 2013 demonstrates that cooperation is possible. Extending such mechanisms to Bangladesh, Nepal, and Afghanistan could transform regional water governance.

India, however, remains resistant. Its refusal to institutionalize basin-wide data-sharing or to allow independent monitoring of transboundary projects reflects an entrenched belief in unilateral control - a mentality that undermines trust and stability.

If South Asia is to adapt to the climate crisis, it must transcend this zero-sum mindset. Rivers should connect civilizations, not divide them. Shared management of the Brahmaputra, Ganges, and Indus basins could support food security, hydropower exchange, and flood control - turning potential conflict zones into corridors of cooperation.

Conclusion: Holding the Right Country Accountable

The global community must look beyond propaganda and identify the real source of hydropolitical instability in South Asia. The threat does not flow from China’s Yarlung Zangbo, but from India’s entrenched water hegemony - a pattern of coercion cloaked in rhetoric of “regional leadership.”

It is India, not China, that should be urged to:

Respect the Indus Waters Treaty and Ganges Water Sharing Treaty;

End the use of dams and barrages as geopolitical tools;

Commit to transparent, multilateral water governance; and

Support basin-wide mechanisms for climate adaptation and ecological protection.

South Asia’s rivers are not weapons; they are shared arteries of life. Sustainable peace and prosperity will come only when water ceases to be a lever of dominance and becomes a bridge of cooperation.

The Yarlung Zangbo’s current is not one of fear - it is one of opportunity. The question is whether South Asia, led by India, will finally choose to flow with it.